Lygin í Hollandi, íslenska bullið og Evrópa

Hvort sem Björgvin G. Sigurðsson laug að hollenskum stjórnvöldum eða ekki var löngu búinn að kokgleypa íslenska útrásarbullið og mærði það heima og erlendis. Björgvin G. verður hvorki marktækari stjórnmálamaður né sök hans minni þótt Hollendingum sé bent á að hver sæmilega greindur maður sá löngu fyrir hrunið á Íslandi að bankarnir hér stóðu á brauðfótum.

Icesave-reikningarnir voru starfræktir í skjóli evrópskra reglna sem margbúið er að sýna fram á að voru illa úr garði gerðar. Fréttir um að Frakkar hafi hafnað Icesave sýna svo ekki verður um villst að stjórnvöld í hverju ríki höfðu töluvert um það að segja hvort íslenska ryksugan fengi starfsleyfi.

Björgvin G. er eins og Samfylkingin sem forherðist. Í stað þess að kannast við Evrópuruglið í Icesave-málinu vill þetta fólk meira af ESB og krefst inngöngu fyrir hönd okkar allra án þess að hafa umboð til þess.

Rannsaka ásakanir um lygar

Athugasemdir

[Hólmsteinn Jónasson (IP-tala skráð) 12.2.2010 kl. 14:21]

 Sænski Ríkisbankinn  At first glance, the European Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (94/19/EC)seems like a great step forward to achieve a unified set of rules protecting Europeanresidents from possible costs of banking failure. However, in the light of increasing cross-border activities it is far from radical to conclude that this directive was not designed for a fully integrated market. In fact, it rather seems to constitute a potential breeding ground for financial instability. First, there is a reason to be concerned about the structure of these systems. A country is not limited to only one DGS but may have more than one scheme for different types of institutions. The terms and details of these schemes are not prescribed by the directive but left to the discretion of each individual member country. These include account coverage, level, ownership, funding, establishment of reserve funds and government support. Second, countries differ greatly in their treatment of troubled institutions and creditors as well as in their efficiency of resolving insolvent banks at a minimum costs to the host country. In general, conflicts of interest occur once the cost of crisis resolution differs between countries. In the case of a cross-border bank with branches in other countries, conflicts of interest certainly concern the question on how far the taxpayers in the home country are willing to go in order to bail out depositors in a host country. This could lead to substantial cross-border transfers. If the reconstruction is successful, the money spent may eventually be recovered by the public. However, this could take considerable time, and a requirement is that you are not betting your taxpayers money on the wrong horse. Hence, policymakers and tax-payers may be very reluctant to take on such risks in another country. Furtermore, national interests in crisis management may lead to agency problems where countries are reluctant to help banks in other member states even though originating from cross-border externalities caused by financial institution in their own jurisdiction.  Realising the large costs involved no country wants to take full responsibility for managing and resolving a crisis. Hence, policy makers will dedicate much effort to ex ante take up a position that is favourable in any future negotiations on national responsibility and crisis resolution. The conflicts of interest will thus have a negative impact on the incentives to share information and the conflicts of interest will further aggravate the problems of information sharing displayed in the previous section. Conflicts of interest will ultimately lead to negotiations. The larger the banking group, the more countries involved and the more important the bank is to the financial system in a country, the higher the stakes for the individual country and the tougher the negotiations. Differences in DGS may complicate crisis managementAnother important concern is how large variations in the roles of the DGS maycomplicate a burden sharing situation. Some of the coordination issues are likelyto be addressed in ex ante agreements. However, in order to ensure that ownerstake the first loss and that the private sector contributes to the resolution, governments may also rely on suboptimal ad hoc negotiations. In a cross-border setting, Frexias (2003) shows that such ex post negotiations lead to under-provision of recapitalisations as countries generally understate their share of the problem.23 To avoid ex-post negotiations one could opt for a burden sharing formula according to some keys (such as relative GDP size, ECB capital ratio and bank assets). The most important question for regulators in such an elaboration process is what procedures to use when deciding on these keys. An example of this difficult balance is to decide whether keys should be fixed or presumably taking into account the geographic spread of the bank’s business. To achieve the latter countries would have to agree upon uniform standards for assessing a bank’s relevance to the financial system of a country. In a constantly changing banking landscape this could turn out to be a very tricky task, however.But also if governments take a direct role in the crisis management the differences between DGS complicate crisis management. Even if a DGS may not be the first usable solution in a large cross-border banking failure, the usage of a DGS has to be included as part of the alternative costs in crisis resolution. The more insolvent an institution is before it is legally closed, the greater are the losses to the insurance funds and its tax payers. In Denmark, Norway and Finland insolvency assessments by the supervisor automatically lead to an activation of the DGS. In Sweden, it would not. This difference exposes the host country insurance funds to regulatory risks as the burden sharing resolution process partly depends on the activation procedures of the home country.   The Nordea case !  In 2003, Nordea Bank publicized plans to become an SE. Its goal has been to integrate its subsidiaries into a single Swedish entity and operate through branches.  A branch structure would enable it to gain centralized supervision, reduce spending on compliance and corporate governance requirements, and lend more money.  A bank may not loan more than 10% of its total capital to a single customer. Capital held by branches counts as the parent company’s.  National-level deposit guarantee schemes, however, have impeded Nordea’s SEconversion. European banks must contribute to funds guaranteeing their savings in everycountry in which they operate.162 Each country has different rules on the coverage limit, priority given to deposits, ex ante or ex post financing, and other features.163 If Nordea became an SE, all of its savings would transfer to the Swedish parent company, and it would make future payments only into Sweden’s scheme. Yet the Member States where Nordea currently operates subsidiaries have refused to refund the money it previously paid them, even though the risk the funds guarantee would shift to Sweden. Nordea has actively petitioned the European Commission for a harmonized, European-level system of deposit guarantees, but so far the Member States have not agreed on a solution.

[Hólmsteinn Jónasson (IP-tala skráð) 12.2.2010 kl. 14:35]

Sænski Ríkisbankinn http://www.bundesbank.de/download/vfz/konferenzen/20071108_09_eltville/paper_persson.pdf

[Jóhannes Laxdal Baldvinsson, 12.2.2010 kl. 14:56]

Það er til lítils að siðvæða flokkana þegar siðlausir kjósendur kjósa þetta lið aftur inn á þing. Björgvin er náttúrulega sér á parti blessaður drengurinn. En við hverju er svo sem að búast af manni sem hefur glatað dómgreindinni vegna áfengisneyslu. Það sem einu sinni glatast kemur ekki svo auðveldlega til baka. Afneitun Björgvins og ofmat á eigin verðleika sannar það best.

[Gísli Foster Hjartarson, 12.2.2010 kl. 17:41]

Þekki Björgvin ekki neitt en eftir hans afrek hefur hann ekkert á þingi að gera og gerir lítt annað en að tefja fyrir hreinsuninni sem þarf að eiga sér stað. Á erfitt með að kyngja veru hans þarna.